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CURRENT LEGAL TRENDS do not bode well for historic preservation. Af-
ter the heady successes in court and Congress during the 1970s, modifi-
cations to the nation's tax laws began to erode the viability of renovating 
historic buildings in the middle part of the 1980s. Recent case law trends 
promise to erode preservation efforts even further. It is timely, there-
fore, to have two excellent books by experts with considerable experi-
ence in historic preservation which summarize from entirely different 
perspectives where we are and where we are going with respect to his-
toric preservation and the law. 
John Costonis, in Icons and Aliens, deals primarily with legal philos-
ophy and the common law. According to Costonis, community values 
often focus around specific structures or districts which become un-
touchable in terms of redevelopment or, indeed, any kind of change. 
These are our icons. The forces of change, whatever their form, are the 
aliens, against which icons must be protected and preserved. The prob-
lem is that our common law, the law of judges and cases, does not pro-
vide clear means to that community end, protecting our icons from ali-
ens. The philosophies which have motivated the jUdges-protecting 
property rights and saddling general welfare with aesthetic burdens-
often run afoul of other equally or more important principles, goals or 
philosophies, like protecting freedom of speech and expression, and 
protecting the rights of individuals to use their property as they like so 
long as they do not injure neighbors or the public at large. 
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The heyday of the common law protection of icons culminated in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,! when the United 
States Supreme Court upheld New York's famous historic preservation 
ordinance and its application to preserve Grand Central Station from the 
"alien" attempt to develop the site into a high-rise office bUilding. State 
cases before and since-particularly since-made it clear that the wel-
fare clause of the police power would be used to preserve historic build-
ings and arguably other things of beauty. (See Berman v. Parker,2 in 
which Douglas's famous dicta recited that the police power could be 
used to make cities beautiful as well as safe.) As Costonis notes, decid-
ing what is beautiful is beyond the capacity of the law, which is able only 
to devise a framework for preservation, not standards therefor. 
In Keeping Time, William Murtagh takes a somewhat different path to 
the same conclusion in terms of success of the historic preservation 
movement, but without concern about resolving the law's role. In rich 
and elaborate detail, Murtagh sets out the prominent role of Congress in 
creating the climate for the National Trust to assume the lead in preserv-
ing significant buildings and districts throughout the country. Promi-
nent in this historical overview are the parts played by the National His-
toric Preservation Act to neutralize the federal bulldozing of important 
structures and neighborhoods in the name of highway building and ur-
ban renewal during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Critical also were tax measures designed to make it profitable to reha-
bilitate old structures rather than tear them down, together with the net-
work of state statutes, preservation officers, and organizations which 
national legislation helped provide. Indeed, a major bonus in his book 
are the copious appendices setting out excerpts from major federal leg-
islation, glossary, and chronology of the historic preservation move-
ment. Murtagh thus concentrates on the written law-statutes, ordi-
nances, regulations-which helped build the preservation movement 
into what it is today. Both authors richly illustrate their points with copi-
ous drawings and photographs that make the books an additional plea-
sure to read. 
However, there are clouds on the horizon that neither book addresses. 
The principal one is a new and growing tendency to provide greater le-
gal protection for regulations passed for health and safety than for wel-
fare; and historic and aesthetic preservation is inextricably tied to the 
welfare clause of the police power. 
1. 438 u.s. 104 (1978). 
2. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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Though the seeds of the distinction are discernible in the renewable 
zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,3 it is set out with 
greater clarity in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedic-
tis,4 in which the Supreme Court recharacterized Holmes' Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahons takings language as "advisory" and set out a modi-
fied test for regulatory takings (all economic use). But Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, also redefmed the goals of the police power 
which would justify a land-use regulation that took all, or at least all 
economic, use of private property: health, the environment, and fiscal 
integrity. This is not necessarily, or even likely, the same as health, 
safety, and welfare. In particular, welfare, is conspicuously absent. 
Nor does Chief Justice Rebnquist restore it writing for the majority in 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles. 6 
Although primarily a compensation issue case (the Court assumed that a 
regulatory taking had occurred and addressed itself primarily to the 
question of whether compensation was an available remedy in a 
regulatory-as compared to a physical-taking case), Rebnquist's dicta 
indicated that he, too, could accept substantial reduction in property 
rights through regulation. The state could "insulate" itself if it could 
show that the law was part of the state's authority to enact" safety regu-
lations. " 
Of course, neither of the aforementioned landmark cases dealt with 
welfare issues. In Keystone, the regulation was directed at subsidence 
caused by coal mining. In First Lutheran, the regulation was directed at 
flood hazards. It is what the California Court of Appeals did on remand 
from the United States Supreme Court in First Lutheran that is most 
chilling.7 Claiming to take its cue from the U.S. and California Supreme 
Courts, as well as a line of "nuisance" cases which preceded and fol-
lowed Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,8 the Court of Appeals sug-
gested that there is no regulatory taking regardless of the use left of the 
subject property-provided the regulation is for health and safety. 
Welfare, however, fares not so well at all. The Court suggests that 
regulations based on aesthetics and premature urbanization will be more 
easily construed as regulatory takings and compensation-provided lit-
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
4. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
5. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
6. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
7. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 210 
Cal. App. 3d 1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 
866 
8. 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
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tie economic use is left-will be available. If this signals the beginning 
of a trend, then splitting off the welfare leg of the police power to stand 
alone will most likely result in measurable more successful challenges 
to welfare-based police power regulations-such as the designation of 
historic structures and districts-coupled with more frequent compen-
sation awards as well. 
In sum, the ground gained by the historic preservation movement in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, all as ably chronicled by 
Costonis and Murtagh, could well be lost if the U.S. Supreme Court 
buys into the double police power standard suggested by the California 
courts. Instead of carefully devising strategies to take the field in order 
to provide a workable framework for preserving our icons as Costonis 
carefully works out, the movement must retire to the ramparts of regula-
tory taking jurisprudence. Instead of celebrating with Murtaugh how far 
the historic preservation movement has come since its fledging days at 
the foundation of the Republic, preservationists will be mourning the 
loss of major legal tools to defend historic heritage. Instead of a culmi-
nation of the historic preservation movement from two different and 
stimulating perspectives which Icons and Aliens and Keeping Time rep-
resent, these two excellent and readable books will become the last pae-
ans to a movement which will have to fight decades-old legal battles 
anew. 
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